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Abstract: Philosophers of biology typically pose questions about individuation 
by asking “what is an individual?” For example, we ask, “what is an individual 
species”, “what is an individual organism”, and “what is an individual gene?” 
In the first part of this chapter, I present my account of the gene concept and 
how it is used in investigative practices in order to motivate a more pragmatic 
approach. Instead of asking “what is a gene?”, I ask: “how do biologists 
individuate genes?”, “for what purposes?”, and “do their practices of 
individuating genes serve these purposes?" In the second part of this chapter, I 
propose that we use this approach when analyzing concepts of organisms and 
biological individuals. Following philosophical pragmatism, I argue that we 
should abstain from attempts to situate individuation of Darwinian individuals 
or of holobionts in a philosophy of nature. Instead, we should analyze practices 
of individuating organisms in terms of three-place relations between the world, 
ideas, and human purposes and actions. I conclude with three lessons: an 
ontological, an epistemological, and a meta-philosophical lesson, which I 
suggest, apply to philosophy of science generally and to philosophy and 
metaphysics at large. 
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1. Introduction 
Biologists and philosophers often ask ‘what is an X?’ with an emphasis on the 
word ‘is’. As Arthur Fine (1996) might remark, it is as if one can hear the 
stamping of feet upon utterance of the word ‘is’ when we ask, what is a 
species, what is an organism, or what is a gene? In the first part of this chapter, 
I motivate a more pragmatic approach to questions about individuals and 
individuation by presenting my account of conceptual practice in genetics. I 
contend that instead of asking “what is a gene?”, philosophers should ask: 
“how do biologists individuate genes?”, “for what purposes?”, and “do their 
practices of individuation serve these purposes?” In the second part of this 
chapter, I propose that we adopt this approach in our analyses of organisms 
and biological individuals. I illustrate how philosophical work on individuation 
typically focuses on questions about what it is to be an individual by 
discussing Peter Godfrey-Smith’s analysis of Darwinian individuals (2009). 
According to his analysis, animals exemplify the paradigm of Darwinian 
individuality. I contend that we should not interpret this claim as a “philosophy 
of nature.” Next, I turn to the idea that the real individuals are holobionts, not 
animals. I challenge the underlying presumption that one concept of 
individuals identifies the real individuals while others do not. But, I 
reappropriate Scott Gilbert, Jan Sapp, and Alfred Tauber’s argumentation 
(2012) for the holobiont view to advance pragmatism; instead of asking ‘what 
is an individual?’ as if there is an essence to (or a paradigm of) individuality, 
philosophers should examine how biologists individuate animals and 
assemblages of animals and commensals and ask what purposes these 
individuating practices can serve. 
2. How biologists individuate genes 
The rise and practice of classical genetics involved individuating mutations 
and segments (i.e. genes) in which mutations occur. Individuating mutations 
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and genes continues to be an important part of practice in contemporary 
genetics. In classical genetics, the individuation of genes was intimately 
connected to the individuation of mutations. Experimental practice involved 
identifying mutations and using mutations to individuate genes. Geneticists 
believed that genes were the fundamental units of heredity, that genes were 
located in cellular structures called ‘chromosomes’, and that mutations were 
differences in genes. One of the central aims of classical genetics was to parse 
chromosomes into their basic functional units, i.e. into genes (the ‘mapping 
project’).1  
 Thomas Hunt Morgan and his collaborators established empirical strategies 
for individuating genes. Working on fruit flies, they searched laboratory 
populations for the appearance of flies with distinctive outward differences 
(compared to other flies in the laboratory population). Upon finding such a 
difference, they conducted breeding experiments to determine whether the 
outward difference was caused by one or a few differences in chromosome(s). 
If they learned that the outward difference was indeed caused by one or a few 
chromosomal differences, they would call the outward difference a difference 
in ‘phenotype’ and the chromosomal difference(s) a difference in ‘genotype’. 
The term ‘mutation’ was used to refer to individual differences in genotype.  
 The Morgan group developed sophisticated breeding strategies for 
determining whether a phenotypic difference was caused by one mutation or a 
few mutations. In cases where a phenotypic difference was caused by a few 
mutations, their breeding strategies enabled them to individuate the different 
mutations responsible for the phenotypic difference. By individuating 
mutations, they individuated genes in which mutations occurred. Morgan’s 
group also developed strategies for determining the relative locations of 
mutations, which effectively determined the relative location of genes in which 
mutations were located The success of these strategies supported the idea that 
mutations and genes were located in linear fashion along the chromosomes.  
 Classical geneticists learned that different mutations could occur in one and 
the same gene, and as the individuation practices of the science advanced 
through the first half of the twentieth century, geneticists established an 
experimental method, called the cis-trans test, for determining whether two 
mutations were located in the same gene or in different genes. This effectively 
provided them with a means for individuating functional units in the 
chromosome, that is, for individuating ‘genes’. In time, geneticists learned how 
to determine the relative location of different mutations occurring within one 
and the same gene. Hence, they learned that genes are functional units 
positioned in linear fashion along chromosomes, that mutations are differences 
within genes, and that these differences are located in linear fashion within the 
genes. 																																																								
1 A more ambitious aim of classical genetics was to investigate a broad range of biological 
processes (see Waters 2004, 2008).  
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 The individuating practices of classical genetics did not depend on 
knowledge about what genes were made of, how genes functioned, what the 
function of genes were, or even how differences in a gene could cause 
differences in phenotype. They did not need to answer the question, “what is a 
gene?” Of course, some theoretically inclined geneticists (especially Hermann 
Joseph Muller, see Carlson 1966) were carrying out investigations aimed at 
determining the material make-up of genes, the nature of gene action, and the 
individual functions of particular genes. One might view theoretical research 
into the question, “what is a gene?”, to have been a metaphysics of sorts—a 
metaphysics that incubated later genetics.2 But, it was not central to the 
practice of the science. Most research involved using genetics to investigate a 
wide range of basic biological processes, not just hereditary processes (Kohler 
1994, Waters 2004, 2008). If one wishes to understand the knowledge of 
classical genetics and how the science worked, one needs to understand how 
classical geneticists individuated mutations and genes. This is required because 
geneticists’ explanations of the transmission of phenotypic differences from 
one generation to the next (their major explanatory feat) and their strategies for 
using genetics to investigate biological processes (their greatest ambition) 
depended on individuating mutations and genes. But, one does not need to 
know how different geneticists might have speculated about the question, 
‘what is a gene?’  
 In sum, classical geneticists shared a minimal concept of the gene. 
Geneticists knew that differences in genes could cause uniform differences in 
phenotype in particular genetic and environmental contexts (Waters 2009), and 
that was an important part of their conception of genes. But, ideas about the 
material make-up, function, or nature of gene action were not part of their 
basic gene concept. But, what about individuation practices in contemporary 
genetics? What concepts do contemporary biologists employ? 
 Contemporary geneticists individuate numerous elements in genetic 
materials: genes, introns, exons, regulatory regions, repetitive regions, 
transposable elements, and many more. For the purposes of this chapter, I 
focus on the individuation of genes at the molecular scale. According to 
textbook definitions, genes are segments of DNA that code for proteins. DNA 
consists of linear sequences of nucleotides. Proteins, roughly speaking, consist 
of polypeptides that are made up of linear sequences of amino acids. The 
textbook idea, as schoolchildren learn, is that genes are segments of DNA that 
produce RNA molecules and RNA molecules produce polypeptides. Linear 
sequences of nucleotides in DNA are said to ‘code for’ linear sequences of 
amino acids in polypeptides.  
 Philosophers have argued that this gene concept is ambiguous, hopelessly 
vague, and that it admits exceptions. Many contend that genes exist at the 
cytological scale, not at the molecular scale. I have addressed these arguments 																																																								
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point. 
Ask “Not What is an Individual?”  Preprint 
C. Kenneth Waters 
	 5 
elsewhere (Waters 1994 and 2001) and will not repeat the details here. Instead, 
I present my analysis of the molecular gene concept and show how it is used in 
contemporary genetics to individuate segments of DNA. I will then describe 
what purposes this practice of individuating serves across biological and 
biomedical sciences. 
 My analysis is cast in causal terms because the common use of 
informational language typically muddles important issues and easily leads to 
exaggerated claims on behalf of contemporary genetics. I therefore refrain 
from characterizing the process of RNA synthesis as ‘transcription’ or the 
process of polypeptide synthesis as ‘translation’. Biologists have investigated 
and explained these processes as biochemical syntheses and it is helpful to 
conceive of them in these terms. But, the question remains, “what is the 
relation between genes and polypeptides?” 
 Some biologists and philosophers say that the segments of nucleotide 
sequences within DNA called genes ‘code for’ the amino acids comprising 
polypeptides. But, this language is unclear, and as I have already mentioned, it 
gives rise to exaggerated claims about the significance of genes. Others say 
that the segments called genes ‘produce’ polypeptides. But, this is also 
misleading. The synthesis of RNA molecules depends on many molecules, not 
just DNA, and the synthesis of polypeptide molecules depends on many 
molecules, not just RNA molecules. So, what, if anything, is the distinctive 
causal role of DNA in the synthesis of RNA molecules and what, if anything, 
is the distinctive role of RNA molecules in the synthesis of polypeptides? 
 The distinctive role of genes is that they are makers of actual differences in 
the synthesis of RNA molecules (I have called them ‘actual-difference 
makers’), and the distinctive role of RNA molecules is that they are makers of 
actual differences in the synthesis of different kinds of polypeptides. Cells 
contain many different kinds of polypeptides, each kind having a particular 
linear sequence of amino acids.3 Although there are many causes of the 
synthesis of polypeptide molecules, most of the causes are uniform across the 
syntheses of different kinds of RNA molecules. RNA is a distinctive cause 
because it takes on different values in the synthesis of different kinds of 
polypeptides. That is, actual differences in the nucleotide sequences of 
different RNA molecules determine the actual differences in amino acid 
sequences in different polypeptide molecules. Hence, they are actual-
difference makers. Likewise, actual differences in nucleotide sequences in 
different genes determine actual difference in nucleotide sequences in different 																																																								
3 Of course, there are always exceptions to general biological claims. In this 
case: some proteins, e.g. prions, take on different conformations in vitro. These 
different conformations could be regarded as different kinds of proteins that 
have identical amino acid sequences. But, this exception does not undermine 
my analysis of gene causation. What it shows is that RNA is not an actual-
difference maker of these different conformations. 
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RNA molecules (in eukaryotes, differences in RNA molecules are often 
determined by differences in genes and differences in splicing agents—see 
below). This is to say that the DNA segments called genes are causes that 
determine differences in amino acid sequences that actually occur in a cell. 
Hence, DNA is a distinctive cause of these actual differences. It is an actual-
difference maker. In this sense, we can say that the sequence of nucleotides in 
a gene determines the sequence of nucleotides in an RNA molecule, which 
determines the sequence of amino acids in a polypeptide.  
 This analysis treats the molecular gene concept as an indexical. DNA 
segments are not simply genes, they are genes for linear sequences. That is, the 
referent of an application of the term ‘gene’ depends on what sequence in an 
RNA molecule or polypeptide is set by the relevant investigative, explanatory, 
or technological context. DNA segments are not simply genes, they are genes 
for sequences at some stage of genetic expression in a particular cellular 
context. (See Waters 2007 for a fuller exposition of this account.) 
 The biological situation gets very complicated in eukaryotes because RNA 
molecules are often edited as they are being synthesized. That is, some regions 
of the RNA molecules, called ‘introns’ are removed and some or all of the 
remaining regions, called ‘exons’, are spliced together. The RNA molecule 
consisting of spliced exons move from the nucleus to the cytoplasm where it 
participates in polypeptide synthesis. Hence, one continuous segment of DNA 
determines the sequence of nucleotides in the primary RNA molecule, but a set 
of discontinuous segments in DNA (a set of exons) determines (or partially 
determines) the sequence of nucleotides in the mature RNA molecule and the 
sequence of amino acids in the polypeptide. What is individuated as the gene? 
Do biologists individuate the continuous segment that determines the linear 
sequence in the primary RNA molecules? Or, do they individuate the 
discontinuous set of DNA segments that determines the linear sequence within 
the RNA exons and partly determines the sequence of nucleotides in the 
polypeptide? 
  It turns out that biologists sometimes individuate genes by including both 
exon and intron regions in DNA, but other times, they individuate genes by 
including only the exon regions. Many philosophers have taken this ambiguity 
to be a serious problem and a reason to doubt that genes exist at the molecular 
scale. But, this is not a problem for individuating. When biologists are 
interested in primary RNA molecules, it serves their interests to individuate 
DNA segments containing both exons and introns. When they are interested in 
polypeptides, it often serves their interest to individuate discontinuous DNA 
segments containing just exons (i.e. ‘split genes’). The molecular concept is an 
indexical concept and its application involves individuating genes for 
particular linear sequences. This makes the practice of individuation both 
flexible and precise. 
 The flexibility of gene individuation practices is especially important in 
navigating the incredibly complicated processes of differential splicing. 
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Biologists have learned that one and the same kind of primary RNA molecule 
is sometimes spliced in hundreds, perhaps even thousands of different ways. 
This makes it possible for one continuous segment of DNA and different 
splicing agents to determine the amino acid sequences in hundreds or even 
thousands of different polypeptides. In one tissue at a particular stage of 
development, one polypeptide is synthesized; in another tissue or at a different 
stage of development, a different polypeptide is synthesized. The molecular 
gene concept is indexed to these different contexts. It is used to individuate 
many different overlapping and discontinuous segments of a DNA molecule as 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
FIG. 1 The molecular gene concept enables biologists to partition DNA in multiple ways. With 
respect to this figure, if biologists are interested in the synthesis of the primary RNA transcript 
(see above), then the DNA segment covered by the bracket directly under ‘gene for primary 
RNA segment’ is the relevant gene (the continuous region of five segments in the DNA 
molecule starting with the solid white segment and ending with the solid black segment). If 
biologists are interested in the synthesis of polypeptide B occurring in some tissue at a 
particular stage of development, then the relevant gene is the discontinuous region marked by 
the brackets directly under ‘gene for polypeptide B’ (the white and grey segments in DNA and 
not the segments between).  
 
 
forthcoming in O. Bueno, M. B. Fagan, and R. Chen (eds.),  preprint 
Individuation Across Experimental and Theoretical Sciences,  
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
	 8	
 The molecular gene concept provides flexibility for individuating DNA 
segments in precise ways. But, this individuation does not yield a unique 
partition of DNA. Classical geneticists might have speculated that there was a 
unique partition of a chromosome into its genes. To employ a commonly used 
metaphor, geneticists might have assumed that DNA could be cut at it joints. 
But, molecular biologists have learned that (in eukaryotes least) this is 
impossible. There are simply too many joints yielding overlapping genes. The 
division of DNA into molecular genes is a complicated mess. Nevertheless, the 
piecemeal practice of individuating genes for particular purposes is an 
important scientific activity across the biological and biomedical sciences.  
3. Purposes served by individuating genes 
Individuating molecular genes is useful and serves a multiplicity of scientific 
aims: to explain, predict, manipulate, and, most importantly, to investigate.  
Consider explanation. Individuating a molecular gene and identifying its 
nucleotide sequence can provide a basis for explaining the linear sequence in 
an RNA and/or polypeptide molecule. Identifying a difference in a gene can 
explain the differences in linear sequences in RNA and/or polypeptide 
molecules. When the difference in linear sequences in RNAs and/or 
polypeptides is simply linked to an outward difference in phenotype, 
identifying the difference in the gene can also explain the difference in 
phenotype. But, these explanations are partial, and their significance is 
typically modest. 
 Gene-based explanations are partial because genes do not control the 
timing of synthesis. At any one time, most genes are not participating in a 
synthesis. Complex regulatory processes determine when the synthesis of 
particular kinds of RNA and polypeptide molecules occur. In multicellular 
organisms, complex regulatory processes also determine where (e.g. in what 
tissue) and when (e.g. at what stages of development) the synthesis of 
particular kinds of RNA and polypeptide molecules occur. The regulatory 
processes are incredibly complex, and it appears impossible to fully explain the 
development of a multicellular creature, or even the functioning of a single 
prokaryotic cell, in terms of genes. The significance of gene-based 
explanations is modest. Genes can be individuated to explain why particular 
molecules have the linear structures they do, but that by itself does not explain 
much. With respect to the countless processes going on within an organism, 
gene-based explanations leave a vast explanatory void.  
 Similar points can be made regarding prediction. Individuating genes is 
useful for making predictions, but most of these predictions are made in the 
context of experimentally manipulated situations. This prompts the question: if 
genes don’t explain or predict that much, why is the individuation of genes so 
central to biological and biomedical practice?   
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 Individuating genes is central to practice because it provides a basis for 
manipulating all kinds of different processes within organisms. This is 
important for medicine, agriculture, and technology. It is also important for 
investigation. The genetic approach to investigation involves using genes to 
manipulate biological structures and processes in ways that will reveal the 
functions of these structures or important aspects of these processes (Waters 
2004, 2008). The results of these investigations are often local and partial. In 
addition, it is worth emphasizing that the explanations yielded from 
intervening on genes are typically not gene-based. Genes are like the scalpels 
of classical physiology. They are used as tools to investigate, not as elements 
in the eventual explanations.  
 The foremost purpose of individuating genes is to forge epistemological 
entry points for explaining and predicting a very narrow range of biological 
phenomena and for manipulating and investigating a much wider breadth of 
phenomena. Genes are not important categories of being (Waters 2017). 
Answering the question “what is it to be a gene?” does not provide important 
metaphysical insights into the functioning or development of organisms. The 
processes by which organisms function and develop are incomprehensibly 
complex. But, biologists have yielded partial and piecemeal accounts of 
aspects of these processes, and they have gained a degree of control over parts 
of them. Given the complexities of the biological world, these are impressive 
achievements. A key to this success involves the individuation of genes. So, 
ask not, “what is a gene?”. Ask “how do biologists individuate genes and for 
what purposes?” 
4. Darwinian Individuality 
Perhaps the stamping of feet is loudest when biologists and philosophers ask 
“what is an organism?” The search has been for a universal analysis, one that 
gets at the essentials of what it is to be an organism. This question has recently 
drawn more attention as biologists have been investigating major evolutionary 
transitions, such as the transition from unicellular organisms to multicellular 
organisms. Theoretical evolutionary biologists need an explanatory target; they 
want to know what features make multicellular entities organisms rather than 
collections of cells so they can construct theoretical models of the transition to 
multicellularity (e.g. Buss 1987, Maynard-Smith and Szachmary 1995, Queller 
and Strassmann 2009). Experimental evolutionary biologists also need to have 
an experimental target (Ratcliff et al 2012). They want to know what features 
would mark evolution towards becoming a multicellular organism so they can 
determine whether their experimental populations of unicellular organisms are 
evolving traits of multicellular individuality.  
 Meanwhile, philosophers interested in questions about individuality have 
moved the target of analysis. What began as the question “what is an 
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organism?” has shifted to “what is a biological individual?”, to “what is an 
evolutionary individual?”, and in some of the most recent work, “what is a 
Darwinian individual?” This shift helps make inquiry more tractable. It is 
much easier to construct a universal answer to a question if it is reframed in 
terms of a theory. Trying to answer “what is an organism?” might force one to 
analyze the incredibly messy world of life, a world that resists essentialist 
analyses. Trying to answer the question, “what is a Darwinian individual?” 
leads one to analyze abstract principles, which are constructed in a tidy 
theoretical framework. One is much more likely to find an answer that appears 
universal, that seems to get at the essentials, if one moves from the question 
“what is an organism?” to the question “what is a Darwinian individual?”  
 Take, for example, Peter Godfrey-Smith’s primary work on individuality 
(2009). Godfrey-Smith answers the question about Darwinian individuality by 
carrying out a careful examination of important elements of contemporary 
Darwinian theory. The details of his analysis do not matter for the purposes of 
this chapter and I will not examine them here. I am not interested in joining the 
lively debate about what it is to be a Darwinian individual.4 My interest is to 
advance a form of pragmatism by proposing that we shift attention away from 
seeking an analysis of individuality, as if it could be read off the best scientific 
theories, to seeking an understanding of individuation practices in science with 
respect to the purposes they serve in scientific inquiry.  
 Godfrey-Smith begins by arguing that reproduction is “at the heart of 
Darwinian evolution”. His subsequent analysis of reproduction leads him to 
identify three parameters defining what it is to be a ‘paradigm’ Darwinian 
individual:  
 
B: passing through a bottleneck between generations such as through 
the production of a fertilized egg that consists of a single cell.  
 
G: featuring reproductive specialization of parts such as the distinction 
of a germ line from somatic cells.  
 
I:  exhibiting overall integration among parts.  
 
Godfrey-Smith points out that each of these parameters admits of degrees. For 
example, a bottleneck might be a narrowing to a single cell, as in the case of 
animals like us, or a narrowing to a relatively small number of cells as in the 
case of plants like aspens.  
 																																																								
4 Although I am not interested in joining the debate, I acknowledge that it has led to fruitful 
philosophical inquiry about (what I would view as) conceptual tools in biology. For example, 
see Jim Griesemer’s critique of Godfrey-Smith’s analysis of reproduction and Griesemer’s 
alternative (2014a and 2014b). 
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Godfrey-Smith claims that entities that exhibit the highest degree of all three 
features, what he calls ‘paradigm Darwinian individuals’, evolve most 
effectively through Darwinian processes. As he puts it, populations consisting 
of paradigm Darwinian individuals are “the kind of system that can produce 
novel and complex organisms, highly adapted to their circumstances” (p. 6, my 
emphasis). Populations made up of “marginal” Darwinian individuals, i.e. 
those that exhibit the three features to lesser degrees, can still evolve, but 
apparently not to the degree of novelty, complexity, and adaptedness of 
paradigm cases. He illustrates his analysis of Darwinian individuality with a 
cube. See Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 
Forms of collective reproduction. 
 
FIG. 2: Godfrey-Smith’s representation of forms of collective reproduction (from Peter 
Godfrey-Smith Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection, Oxford: University Press, 2009.  
 
 
 
 Godfrey-Smith applies his framework to major evolutionary transitions. He 
explains: 
 
The framework developed here is intended to be useful when thinking 
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about transitions, especially their intermediate stages. We often find 
populations that have a marginal Darwinian status – for example, 
collective entities that are somewhat organism-like, but not all the way 
there. A great array of this can also be seen in aquatic life, in which 
there is a variety of forms of partial integration of cells and simple 
organisms into collective entities, including seaweeds, corals, and 
sponges. (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 8–9) 
 
He posits that “marginal” Darwinian individuals can get ‘all the way there’ by 
evolving into “paradigm” Darwinian individuals: 
 
As a transition of this kind occurs, a population may appear first as a 
marginal case, from a Darwinian point of view – an ensemble of 
collective entities who can only be said to reproduce in an extended, 
generous sense, who barely count as individuals at all. But there may 
be successive increases in integration [and presumably in B and G as 
well], until the entities display a well-defined mode of reproduction at 
the higher level, with heritable variation in the traits found at that 
level. The collective becomes a paradigm case.  (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 
9) 
 
According to Godfrey-Smith’s account, evolutionary processes themselves 
evolve—a point John Beatty made forcefully to challenge the received view of 
theories (Beatty 1982). Beatty argued that there are no necessary, that is, no 
non-contingent, laws of evolution. He used the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium 
from population genetics as an example. This principle depends on the 
individual alleles of a diploid pair being segregated in processes that give them 
equal probabilities of being transmitted to any given gamete. But, as Beatty 
argued, there are known exceptions to this kind of random segregation. In 
exceptional cases, some alleles have a greater than 50% chance of being 
transmitted. The Hardy-Weinberg principle, a central principle of the 
evolutionary theory called population genetics, does not apply to these alleles. 
Beatty argued that organisms could evolve such that the Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium rarely applied to any of them. The processes underlying evolution 
are evolving and the so-called laws that describe today’s processes might not 
describe tomorrow’s.  
 Alison McConwell has recently extended Beatty’s contingency thesis to 
argue that, since evolutionary individuality is a contingent result of evolution, 
we should expect it to take on a plurality of forms (2017a, 2017b). Like 
Beatty’s, McConwell’s conception of biological diversity is not progressive. 
She does not assume that there is any directionality to second-order 
evolutionary processes. She also does not assume that there is a hierarchy of 
evolutionary processes associated with a hierarchy of forms of individuality. 
Instead, there is a contingent plurality.  
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 Ellen Clarke has also argued for a plurality of individuality (2013), but 
Clarke’s conception is quite different than McConwell’s. Clarke’s argument 
assumes that Darwinian processes are unchanging in the sense that the basic 
principles of Darwinian theory always apply. She argues that to evolve via 
these processes, organisms must have certain features, and that these features 
define what it is to be an evolutionary individual. Plurality enters into her 
picture because these features can be instantiated in different ways. So, 
individuality is bounded by the stability of evolutionary dynamics, but within 
these bounds, there can be abundant diversity. Whereas McConwell follows 
Beatty’s idea that evolution itself evolves (what I am calling ‘second-order 
evolution’) and hence, imposes no fixed boundaries on individuality, Clarke’s 
analysis assumes that evolution itself is stable. 
 Godfrey-Smith’s conception of the plurality of individuality is different 
from both Clarke’s and McConwell’s conceptions. Like Beatty, he believes 
evolutionary processes are themselves evolving. Godfrey-Smith maintains that 
as collectives of entities in an evolving population take on the three features of 
being a paradigm Darwinian individual, the evolutionary process itself 
changes. At an early stage of evolution, when the collectives are merely 
marginal Darwinian individuals, the system can evolve these collectives. In 
some cases, as the collectives (or “marginal individuals”) evolve, they 
increasingly take on the features of being a paradigm Darwinian individual. In 
these cases, the evolutionary process itself changes and it “can produce novel 
and complex organisms, highly adapted to their circumstances” (p. 6). 
Godfrey-Smith’s account of the transition to multi-cellularity proceeds from 
the evolution of collectives of unicellular organisms to the evolution of 
marginal Darwinian individuals, and then, from the evolution of marginal 
Darwinian individuals to the evolution of paradigm Darwinian individuals. The 
second-order evolutionary process is viewed as leading towards a more 
effectively evolving population with individuals that are more fully integrated, 
and hence, in an important sense, as being progressive.5 The plurality of 
multicellular individuality evidently represents different stages of a second-
order evolutionary process.  
5. The Great Cube of Being? 
What might readers take to be the metaphysical significance of Godfrey-
Smith’s analysis? On the one hand, Godfrey-Smith sometimes qualifies his 
statements with phrases such as ‘from a Darwinian view’, which suggests that 																																																								
5 In later writings, Godfrey-Smith says that the transition can be reversed, that populations of 
paradigm individuals can evolve into populations of marginal individuals. This, however, is 
consistent with the idea that the transition towards paradigm individuality is progressive in the 
sense that it leads towards populations that can evolve more effectively and individuals that are 
more integrated. 
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his analysis is not intended to have metaphysical significance. On the other 
hand, in the introduction of Darwinian Populations (2009), he explicitly states 
that his account does have such significance. He distinguishes between 
science, philosophy of science, and philosophy of nature. The third kind of 
investigation, the philosophy of nature, is a form of metaphysics. He says his 
book “moves constantly between these three kinds of investigation.”  
 
“The focus of science”, Godfrey-Smith writes, “is the natural world.” He 
envisions philosophy of science (as many philosophers do) as a theory-focused 
meta-discipline:  
 
The focus of philosophy of science is science itself. The aim is to 
understand how science works and what it achieves. Here we ask what 
kinds of contact with the world theories can have – how they function 
as representations, how they can yield understanding. We ask about 
the role of worthy but vexed goals such as truth, simplicity, and 
explanatory power and about the nature of evidence, testing and 
scientific change. (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2) 
 
Philosophy of nature, Godfrey-Smith writes: 
 
is the project of taking science as developed by scientists, and working 
out what its real message is, especially for larger questions about our 
place in nature. (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 3) 
 
As mentioned above, he claims that his book (2009) constantly moves between 
science, philosophy of science, and philosophy of nature. With this in mind, 
readers might ask about philosophy of nature. What is the “real message” 
implied by this analysis about “our place in nature?” Godfrey-Smith never 
says.6 But, readers searching for its “real message” might wonder whether the 
three-dimensional cube of individuality could represent the Great Cube of 
Being with animals like us perched at the pinnacle, plants “not all the way 
there”, and creatures like sponges and slime molds having a long way to go. It 
is unclear where bacteria and archaea would fit in. Viewed as a philosophy of 
nature, the cube suggests a grand metaphysical view, and possibly, a seductive 
one. After all, it reinforces some traditional Western ideas about our place in 
nature. 
I suggest we resist such interpretations by abandoning the project of 																																																								
6 In the rest of this section, my intention is to identify what readers might take to be ‘the real 
message … about our place in nature’ of Godfrey-Smith’s account of individuality. I am not 
claiming that what follows describes Godfrey-Smith’s own views about the metaphysical 
significance of his cubic analysis. Other than implying that his account has metaphysical 
significance, he is coy with respect to this issue. 
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philosophy of nature altogether. Instead of viewing scientific theories as 
having some “real message” about our place in nature, or even about our place 
on the cube of Darwinian being, we can view science more modestly, as a 
system for investigating the world that provides us means for describing, 
explaining, predicting, manipulating and investigating aspects of parts of the 
world that are important to us. 
6. Holobionts 
A number of biologists and philosophers have recently argued that animals, as 
traditionally conceived, are not biological individuals at all. Rather, they are 
parts of individuals. The real individuals are multispecies assemblages made 
up of the animal and the symbiotic microbes (bacteria, archeae, and viruses) 
living with it, for example living within their guts or on their skins.  More 
generally, they argue that holobionts, collectives consisting of eukaryotic hosts 
and symbiotic microbes, are the real individuals.  
 Again, I am not interested in joining the debate about whether this or that 
kind of biological entity is a real individual. My interest is to advance 
pragmatism. I will not be defending or criticizing the idea that holobionts, 
rather than the eukaryotic hosts within holobionts, are the real individuals (just 
as I have not defended or criticized Godfrey-Smith’s conception of Darwinian 
individuality). Instead, I will propose that the concepts of animal and of 
holobiont should be understood as tools biologists use to individuate entities. 
On this view, philosophers should analyze how and why biologists use the 
holobiont concept (as well as other concepts) to individuate. The literature on 
holobionts is a rich source for motivating my pragmatic perspective on 
individuation because it connects to a broad range of scientific and medical 
interests. I will use a thought-provoking article “A Symbiotic View of Life: 
We Have Never Been Individuals” by Scott Gilbert, Jan Sapp, and Alfred 
Tauber (2012) to develop my position. 
 Before turning to Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber’s paper, it is useful to point out 
two features of holobionts that have figured into the debate about whether it is 
these assemblages, or alternatively whether it is the eukaryotic hosts within 
them, that are the real individuals. The first feature is that holobionts are 
functionally integrated. Eukaryotic hosts could not survive or reproduce 
without their microbial collaborators. And many holobiont microbes critically 
depend on their hosts as well. Considerations about functional integration 
motivate the idea that holobionts are individuals. But, another feature of 
holobionts pulls in the other direction. Holobiont reproduction typically 
involves ‘horizontal’ as well as ‘vertical’ transmission. Parent/descendant 
relationships are usually conceived of in terms of vertical transmission. The 
cells in an offspring are all descendants of cells in the offspring’s parent(s). 
This conception of transmission generally applies to plants and animals. But, 
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holobionts are different. The microbes in a holobiont are often recruited from 
the environment, rather than inherited from the parent holobiont. That is, many 
of the microbes in a holobiont are not descendants of microbes in the parent 
holiobiont(s); they are descendants of microbes that were transmitted from the 
environment. Considerations about horizontal transmission motivate the idea 
that holobionts are not individuals because evolution by natural selection 
presumably requires vertical transmission.7 
 Much of the philosophical literature in the debate about whether holobionts 
are real individuals concerns whether the means by which they reproduce are 
consistent with the mechanism of evolution by means of natural selection. But 
Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber’s paper takes a broader perspective to argue for two 
theses: (1) entities we usually consider individuals, such as multicellular plants 
and animals, are not genuine individuals, and (2) the real individuals are 
holobionts. 
 The central line of reasoning leading to the first thesis in Gilbert, Sapp, and 
Tauber (2012), hereafter ‘GST’, proceeds as follows: 
 
1. from an anatomical conception of individuality, animals are not 
individuals 
2. from a developmental conception of individuality, animals are not 
individuals 
3. from a physiological conception of individuality, animals are not 
individuals 
4. from a genetic conception of individuality, animals are not 
individuals 
5. from an immunological conception of individuality, animals are 
not individuals 
Although it is not necessary for my purposes to examine how they justify each 
of these claims, it will be instructive to briefly examine a couple of their 
arguments. I begin with their argument that from a physiological conception, 
animals are not individuals.  
 The physiological view of individuality is traced by GST to the early and 
mid-nineteenth century writings of Henri Milne-Edwards and Rudolf Leuckart. 
The basic idea was that the parts of a complex organism cooperate for the good 
of the whole. After Darwin, this developed into the view that evolution led to 
an “ever-increasing integration through the division of labor.” (p. 329). This 
integration evolved within cells and also among the cells of multicellular 																																																								
7 For a different idea of what is required for evolution by natural selection, see Roughgarden et 
al 2017. 
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organisms. The idea that cooperation of parts is an important feature of being 
an organism is indeed a central theme in the scientific literature on 
individuality. For example, it is one of the two axes that Queller and Strassman 
set out to map the space of organismality (2009).  
 Biologists have learned that the division of labor favored by selection can 
be achieved through an integration of functioning among different species 
living together—for example, by an integration of activities carried out by an 
animal host and its microbial symbionts. GST list numerous findings about 
how microbial symbiosis contributes to the physiological functioning of 
animals ranging from insects to mammals. They cite research that shows that 
bacterial symbionts are required for lipid metabolism, detoxification, colonic 
pH regulation, vitamin synthesis, intestinal permeability, and suppression of 
dangerous immune responses. They conclude that examples such as these show 
that “on classic physiological grounds, animals are not individuals.” (Gilbert, 
Sapp, and Tauber 2012, p. 330).  
 GST argue that animals are not individuals from a genetic conception of 
individuality on the grounds that allelic variations in the host genome are not 
the basis for phenotypic variation in the host. Biologists have learned, they 
contend, that the genome of importance is what is called the hologenome (the 
combined genome of the host and microbial symbionts). They support this idea 
by describing how the synthesis of phenylalanine in the mealy bug 
Planococcus requires several enzymes. Only one of them is encoded in the 
genome of the host; the others are encoded in the genomes of two nested 
bacteria contained in the host. They argue: 
 
the genomes of all three organisms have been altered through this 
symbiosis.   … genomes evolve in such a manner that they need their 
partners to achieve complex genetic integration. None of the three 
species … has a “complete” genome. It is the holobiont that does. 
(Gilbert et al. 2012, 329 - 330) 
 
On the basis of examples such as this one, GST conclude, that on genetic 
grounds, animals are not individuals.  
 Similar example-based arguments are offered for GST’s claims that 
animals are not individuals from anatomical, developmental, and 
immunological conceptions (claims 1, 2, and 5 above). But, arguing that 
animals are not individuals is not the same as arguing that holobionts are 
individuals. GST shift their emphasis to their second main thesis, the thesis 
that holobionts are genuine individuals, when they consider individuality from 
an evolutionary perspective.  
 GST begin by noting that evolutionary individuality has been conceived in 
terms of ‘that which can be selected’ in the process of evolution. They 
continue: 
 Usually, these individuals are genes or monogenomic 
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the above discussion, it is evident that organisms are anatomically, 
physiologically, developmentally, genetically, and immunologically 
multigenomic and multispecies complexes. Can it be that organisms are 
selected as multigenomic associations? Is the fittest in life’s struggle the 
multispecies group, and not an individual of a single species in that group? 
(Gilbert et al. 2012, p. 331) 
 They answer this question by describing an example of a holobiont, pea 
aphids and their endogenous microbes, which they argue satisfies the 
conditions for group selection. Much of their discussion is aimed at showing 
that the holobiont immune system provides a mechanism against cheating, a 
potential constraint inhibiting group selection. 
 It is worth noting that the example chosen by GST to advance their case 
that holobionts are evolutionary individuals has a distinctive feature: one of the 
bacterial symbionts is nested within the other and both are nested within the 
aphids. This means that reproduction of these assemblages is vertical. Hence, 
Godfrey-Smith classifies these holobionts as Darwinian individuals while he 
maintains that holobionts which exhibit horizontal transmission count as 
‘organisms’ but not as ‘Darwinian individuals’ (2012).  In contrast, GST do 
not seem concerned with modes of transmission and draw a general 
conclusion:  
 
Thus, animals can no longer be considered individuals in any sense of 
classical biology: anatomical, developmental, physiological, 
immunological, genetic, or evolutionary. … the holobiont, with its 
integrated community of species, becomes a unit of natural selection 
whose evolutionary mechanisms suggest complexity hitherto largely 
unexplored. (Gilbert et al. 2012, p. 334) 
 
As mentioned, I will not take sides in debates about questions of the form 
“who are the real individuals?” But, it is worth mentioning that just as the cube 
of being a Darwinian individual resonates with the idea of the great chain of 
being, the idea that real individuals are assemblages of diverse organisms 
cooperating as functional wholes has its romantic appeal.  
 
For animals, as well as plants, there have never been individuals. This new 
paradigm for biology asks new questions and seeks new relationships 
among the different living entities on Earth. We are all lichens. (Gilbert et 
al. 2012, p. 336) 
 
But, microbiologists and biomedical scientists would note that many of the 
microbes within us and on us are not cooperating, and many that cooperate at 
certain times or in certain contexts do not cooperate at other times or in other 
contexts. Gilbert and other proponents of the holiobiont view explicitly 
acknowledge this. For example, Roughgarden et al. (2017) include pathogens 
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as an integral part of the holiobiont assemblage. Relationships between hosts 
and their microbes are dynamic, potentially adversarial, and often fragile.  
 Readers should resist interpreting the view offered by GST as a philosophy 
of nature, as a metaphysics that identifies the “real message” of the science 
about our place in nature. On the other hand, the idea they develop in the 
concluding section of their paper (and mentioned in the above quotation) that 
conceiving holobionts as individuals opens up new opportunities for numerous 
fields ranging from medicine to conservation biology is an idea worth 
philosophical attention. 
7. Purposes served by individuating organisms and the like 
Maureen O’Malley suggests that questions about individuality should be 
framed in terms of the explanatory usefulness of different concepts 
(forthcoming). She begins by pointing out that distinguishing between 
biological individuals (or ‘metabolic individuals’) and evolutionary individuals 
(or ‘Darwinian individuals’) is becoming standard practice among 
philosophers writing on questions about individuality. In this paper, she 
challenges the idea that one of these concepts has explanatory priority. Instead, 
she maintains: 
There are explanatory and descriptive aims that can only be achieved when 
the constituent entities of multispecies biological individuals are separated, 
and other aims that rule out such separation. These explanatory 
differences rest on the distinction between biological and evolutionary (i.e., 
Darwinian) individuals, and an acknowledgement that neither has out–
and–out priority free of explanatory context. (O’Malley forthcoming, 4) 
 
Although O’Malley’s focus is on explanatory utility and (in the paper quoted 
here) on the explanation of major evolutionary transitions in individuality, her 
idea that different concepts of individuality serve different aims can be 
generalized and localized. First, it can be generalized with respect to more than 
two distinctive sets of explanatory aims. The idea that biologists tune their 
individuations of entities to different explanatory interests is a powerful one. 
We can use this idea as a basis for reappropriating the argumentation of GST. 
 The examples discussed in GST connect to a broad range of explanatory 
interests: anatomical, developmental, physiological, genetic, and 
immunological. Their mode of argumentation identifies numerous examples 
where a property or process depends not just on the animal host, but also on its 
symbiotic microbes. They infer from these dependencies that the animal host is 
not a genuine individual. Recall their example of the synthesis of 
phenylalanine in the mealy bug Planococcus. The synthesis, they point out, 
depends on an enzyme from the animal host and on several enzymes of two 
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different symbiotic bacteria. The individual, they argue, could not be the 
animal host, and presumably, must be the assemblage of host plus bacterial 
symbionts. We can reframe this reasoning in terms of the usefulness of 
individuating entities. If one’s aim is to explain (or for that matter, to 
manipulate—see below) the synthesis of phenylalanine in these creatures, then 
it is useful to individuate the assemblage. Individuating the animal within 
might obscure explanatorily relevant enzymes and DNA. 
 I propose that we interpret the arguments of GST as arguments about the 
usefulness of individuating assemblages for various purposes. We can drop 
O’Malley’s tacit assumption that there must be one correct way to individuate 
organisms. And, we can think of the purposes in a more fine-grained, localized 
manner. One could entertain the possibility that for the purpose of explaining 
the synthesis of phenylalanine in Planococcus, it is best to individuate 
assemblages, whereas for the purposes of explaining other biochemical 
syntheses, it might be more useful to individuate the animal host.   
 The idea that biologists can individuate in a multiplicity of ways to serve a 
variety of explanatory purposes can be generalized in a second way. The 
purposes of individuation extend beyond the descriptive and explanatory. They 
also include purposes of investigation, manipulation, and prediction. 
Broadening philosophical attention to these purposes could move inquiry well 
beyond the areas of biological science that currently receive the most 
philosophical attention. It could also reveal that the conceptual division 
between biological individuals and evolutionary individual is too blunt; 
biologists fine-tune their individuation practices to serve specific interests. 
Consider the concept of ‘evolutionary individual’. 
 Philosophers writing on the concept of ‘evolutionary individual’ generally 
assume that evolutionary individuals must be the units of Darwinian evolution, 
which is generally taken to mean the units of selection. This is why Godfrey-
Smith grounds his analysis of Darwinian individual in terms of selection 
theory. It is also why in seeking to establish that holobionts are individuals 
from an evolutionary perspective, GST argue that holobionts meet the 
conditions for group selection. But, Darwinian theory cannot be reduced to the 
theory of transmutation by natural selection. Darwin’s Origin of Species was 
based on two main ideas: (1) transmutation by means of natural selection; and 
(2) common ancestry. The idea that species differentiate into varieties and 
varieties further differentiate by means of natural selection was critical to the 
explanatory power of Darwin’s theory (Waters 2003).  
 In contemporary Darwinian (or no-Darwinian) theory, the processes 
responsible common ancestry (for the origin and differentiation of varieties) 
are conceived as speciation. Speciation has been and continues to be a central 
investigative topic in evolutionary biology. Yet, it has largely escaped the 
attention of philosophers writing about evolutionary individuality. Starting 
with Hull (1978), philosophers have written a lot about whether species are 
individuals, but they haven’t paid much attention to the question of how 
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entities (organisms) making up species should be conceived for the purposes of 
explaining speciation processes. 
 An integral part of speciation involves populations becoming 
reproductively isolated from one another. A prominent idea is that differential 
mating preferences play an important role in the evolutionary development of 
reproductive isolation. Laboratory biologists have investigated how this 
development might proceed. Consider the following empirical study. In 
laboratory experiments with Drosophila flies, Diane Dodd randomly divided a 
homogenous population of flies into two groups. She propagated one group on 
a molasses medium and the other group on a starch medium. The populations 
developed mating preferences. Flies propagated on one medium developed a 
preference to mate with flies propagated on the same medium. That is, 
molasses flies (flies evolved on the molasses medium) preferred to mate with 
other molasses flies rather than starch flies (Dodd 1989). Recently, 
experimenters demonstrated that this diet-induced mating preference depends 
on microbial symbionts (Sharon et al. 2010 and 2011). When the two 
populations were treated with antibiotics, thus eliminating the bacteria, the 
flies no longer exhibited mating preferences. These experiments indicate that it 
can be useful to individuate holobionts, rather than just animals, when 
investigating processes of speciation. In some scientific contexts, e.g. the 
context of theorizing about transmutation by means of natural selection, 
individuating evolutionary entities at the level of animal hosts might be most 
useful. But, in other scientific contexts, e.g. the context of investigating 
speciation, individuating evolutionary entities at an assemblage level might be 
better. The brute conceptual division between biological individual and 
evolutionary individual does not do justice to what should be nuanced practices 
of individuation.  
 This case reveals three things. First, biologists have a multiplicity of 
purposes for individuating organisms. Second, purposes for individuating, 
even evolutionary biologists’ purposes for individuating, are best served by 
fine-grained practices of individuation that cross-individuate entities. Third, 
biologists’ individuation of entities in the context of experimentation may 
reveal scientific aims, such as the aim to investigate speciation that can be lost 
in the context of abstract theorizing. Philosophers’ preoccupation with 
analyzing abstract theories obscures the diversity of purposes in science and 
leads us to oversimplify our philosophical understanding of biological 
practices of individuation. 
8. Three lessons 
Following philosophical pragmatism, we should view practices of 
individuation in terms of three-place relations, between the world, ideas, and 
human purposes and actions. My three lessons can be viewed in terms of 
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Charles Morris’s account of semiosis (1938). Although I draw these lessons 
with respect to philosophy of biology, I believe they apply to philosophy of 
science more generally, and in fact, to philosophy at large.  
 
 The first lesson concerns the world, that is, ontology. Much of the general 
philosophical literature on individuality is based on the assumption, or perhaps 
I should say the faith, that the world is neatly divided into individuals. This is 
also evident in philosophy of biology. With respect to genes, when 
philosophers learned that DNA is not neatly divided into genes, they decided 
that genes must not exist at the molecular scale. The real entities of heredity, 
they inferred, must be found elsewhere. Indeed, the findings of genetics 
indicate that DNA is not neatly divided into elements that line up with a 
uniquely correct and comprehensive partition of developmental processes. But, 
the ontological conclusion we should draw is that the processes by which 
organisms function and develop are, as a whole, incomprehensibly complex. 
They are a mess; a mess with lots of structure, but no overall structure. That’s 
the way it is. 
 With respect to the ontology of organisms, philosophers have become 
increasingly open to the idea that the world might not be neatly divided into 
just one kind of individual, that there might be multiple kinds of individuals, 
perhaps even cross-identifying kinds of individuals (e.g. organisms versus 
evolutionary individuals). But, almost all recent philosophical attention has 
been devoted to analyzing what it is to be an evolutionary individual, not what 
it is to be an organism. It is as if the processes of evolution must define what it 
is to be an organism because, after all, organisms are products of evolution. In 
addition, the distribution of philosophical attention suggests there is an 
assumption among many philosophers that what it is to be an evolutionary 
individual can be established by analyzing the best scientific theory, which is 
taken to be the theory of natural selection as developed in the framework of 
population genetics. But, scientific findings discussed in this chapter indicate 
that the empirical world (as contrasted with the abstract world of Darwinian 
theory) is not neatly divided into evolutionary individuals. The processes of 
evolution are extremely complex and the results of these complex processes 
have not yielded a neat parsing of life into individuals. The processes of 
evolution are a mess; a mess with lots of structure, but no overall structure. 
That’s the way the world is (Waters 2017). 
 The second lesson concerns epistemology. Concepts should be conceived 
as tools, used to help achieve particular purposes. Biologists use concepts to 
individuate different entities and processes. These tools serve a number of 
scientific and technological interests, but they do not provide the basis for a 
philosophy of nature or for grand views about the living world and our place 
within it. To be clear, my targets are not particular analyses of individuality, 
such as Godfrey-Smith’s or Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber’s. My target is the 
metaphysical presumption that scientific theories have a “real message” about 
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‘our place in nature.’ The molecular gene concept is used to individuate 
segments of DNA in ways that serve a multiplicity of purposes, including 
purposes to investigate, explain, predict, and manipulate biological entities and 
processes. But, this tool does not provide the means to draw a univocal parsing 
of DNA that structures the overall processes of development or the functioning 
of organisms. Likewise, concepts of organismality including those based on 
metabolic, immunological, symbiotic, and evolutionary viewpoints, are used to 
individuate life in a multiplicity of ways that serve different human purposes. 
Philosophers have emphasized explanatory purposes, and particularly purposes 
related to explaining the evolution of creatures like us. But, description and 
explanation do not exhaust the aims of science. Scientists also aim to 
manipulate, control, investigate, and predict. This brings us to the third lesson, 
which is meta-philosophical. 
 The meta-philosophical lesson is future looking and pertains to what 
questions should guide philosophical inquiry. I conclude that instead of asking, 
“what is a biological individual?”, philosophers should ask what ways of 
conceiving biological individuality could be useful? In what contexts and for 
what purposes would they be useful? Could one concept be useful for 
situations in which biologists use several concepts? In situations where 
biologists use one concept, could a different concept, or a multiplicity of 
concepts better serve their purposes? Might purposes exist in medicine, public 
health, or environmental science that would be better achieved by using new 
concepts of individuality? Pursuing these kinds of questions, couched in terms 
of purposes, could move philosophers beyond analyzing science solely in 
terms of description, explanation, and prediction. It could decrease our 
obsession with the philosophical methodology of grounding analysis in 
abstract theories. Pursuing these questions could also lead to deeper and more 
inclusive understandings of science, and a more useful philosophy of science. 
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